COMMANDERS DIGEST

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GUEST SPEAKER—Lt. Gen. Frank J. Sackton (left), Comptroller of the U.S. Army, is welcomed to Maxwell AFB, Ala., by Lt. Gen. A. P. Clark, Air University commander. Gen. Sackton addressed the first class of the professional military comptroller course at Air University's Institute for Professional Development.

Katzenbach Outlines Development Of International Power Structure

Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach believes that in today's world the international power of any nation is not determined solely by military and economic strength.

In fact, he told the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco Aug. 9, a nation's prestige, and the weight of influence it can bring to bear are equally important.

"And these depend in large measure," he said, "on such intangibles as the nation's internal cohesion, its self-confidence, its unity, its drive and sense of purpose."

Under Secretary Katzenbach told his audience that he wanted to concentrate principally on foreign policy problems as they seem to be emerging, but that they could not be considered apart from domestic developments.

He said the United States is still by far the richest country in the world; that our defensive capabilities remain the strongest of any nation; that our gross national product has doubled in the last 14 years and poverty has generally declined.

"Despite our wealth," he continued, "it is clear that as a people we are more divided among ourselves, more preoccupied with domestic problems, and less certain where to head in a confusing and shifting world."

But not all of this is bad, he said. "Much of it, in fact, stems from a

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Clifford Discounts Import of 'Lull' In Vietnam War

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford said Aug. 15 he did not attach undue significance to the recent "so-called lull" in the Vietnam war noting "there have been periods of enemy activity and periods of lull."

Secretary Clifford told a Pentagon news conference, "We have found in the past that he (the North Vietnamese) alternates a period of great activity with an offensive and then with weeks of rest and regroupment, re-equipment, training, and preparation for another round of attacks.

"You will recall, "we saw a lull earlier this year followed by the so-called Tet offensive. Then we had quite a lull before the so-called May offensive. Now we are in another lull."

He said information from prisoner interrogations, captured documents and other forms of intelligence pointed out that the enemy was in one of those periods of preparation.

"We see plans and troop movements directed at what appears to be planned attacks with reference to specific areas in South Vietnam," he said.

There are uncertain factors involved, Mr. Clifford said, noting that when the enemy places himself in the posture of being able to start an offensive, he also reserves for himself the option of delaying that offensive, if he chooses, and of setting the time of the start of any offensive.

"As far as our intelligence is concerned," Mr. Clifford said, "we find a number of similarities in the period preceding the Tet offensive and pre-

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RIVER PATROL—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, listens to Quartermaster First Class Steven Holt explain how his river patrol boat (PBR) helps prevent the enemy from moving arms and supplies along the Mekong Delta waterways. Holt is a boat captain on one of the 31-foot PBRs. Adm. Moorer was in South Vietnam touring Navy installations.

DOD Issues Statistics on Participation In Service Savings Deposit Program

Statistics show the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program is continuing to grow in stature as military personnel in increasing numbers take advantage of the saving splan that pays 10 per cent interest to members of the armed forces stationed overseas.

Military personnel stationed in Southeast Asia account for approximately 45 per cent ($161 million) of total deposits and 42 per cent (83,585) of the total number of accounts.

The Defense Department said Aug. 16 that new deposits in the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program amounted to $225.7 million in fiscal year 1968. Total deposits from inception of the program in September, 1966, through June 30, 1968, amounted to $358.2 million.

The total deposits do not reflect amounts withdrawn by personnel who closed their accounts—as required—within 90 days after return from overseas.

Cumulative amounts withdrawn approximate $104.5 million. Net cash balances on hand June 30, 1968, as totaled $253.7 million.

As of June 30, 1968, there were 197,313 participants in the program, a net increase of 48,102 accounts during fiscal year 1968.

Although not expanding at a rate as fast as early in the program, participation of eligible military personnel increased from 14.0 per cent on June 30, 1967, to 17.2 per cent on June 30, 1968.

The savings program was established under the authority of Public Law 89-538, approved Aug. 14, 1966, and primarily aimed at reducing the United States deficit in the international balance of payments.

Participation in the program is limited to overseas military personnel on active duty. The President prescribed that amounts deposited under the program would earn interest at the rate of 10 per cent, compounded quarterly. The rate is applicable to accounts of $10,000 or less.

IRS Clarifies Rule On Tax Refund Due Widows of Combat Vets

The widow of a serviceman who dies while serving in a combat zone is entitled to a refund of income taxes paid that are attributable to her community share of her husband's military pay, according to the Internal Revenue Service.

In its pamphlet, Internal Revenue Bulletin, No. 1968-30, and dated July 22, 1968, a clarification is made of a widow's rights in community property states. They are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.

The bulletin says:

"A wife, a legal resident of a community property state, filed separate Federal income tax returns for the years 1965 and 1966 in which she reported one-half of her husband's compensation for active service in the Armed Forces of the United States. In 1967, the husband was killed in action while serving in a combat zone. He had originally served in the combat zone in 1965. The widow filed for refunds of income taxes paid for the years 1965 and 1966.

"Held, pursuant to the provisions of section 692 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the widow is entitled to a refund of all income taxes paid that are attributable to her community share of her husband's military compensation. In addition, a refund of all income taxes paid on the husband's returns for the years involved may be made to the executor or the administrator of his estate, or to his widow if he has no other legal representative."

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Clifford on 'Lull' in Vietnam War

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ceding the May offensive, the same kind of movement of the troops, the same kind of instructions, similarities in the order of battle.

"All of this falls in quite a clear pattern, very similar to the previous two offensives this year. We have no alternative, obviously, but to proceed on the assumption that there will be a third enemy offensive."

At this point the Secretary of Defense made two points: "Whether it comes off on schedule depends to some extent upon the strategy and tactics of General (Creighton W.) Abrams (CG, U. S. Army Vietnam, Cmdr., U. S. MACV).

"He is constantly mounting spoiling operations. Whenever information comes in of some collection or accumulation of troops in an area, he moves at once; or information comes in about the accumulation of material, weapons or supplies, he moves at once.

"So he has been maintaining a daily spoiling operation. One doesn't know the net results of that type of effort until later on when the whole story unfolds. Also, we have the other unknown factor. That is what other considerations the enemy might be studying with reference to the timing of its offensive.

"They could perhaps give some consideration to developments in Paris. They possibly could give some consideration to developments in Saigon. It is even possible they could give some consideration to developments in Washington. So that they have the ability and discretion to time this as they see fit."

On the subject of increased infiltration from the North, Secretary Clifford explained: "It has been larger this year, larger this year than at any time since we have been following it. It has been larger lately. You will recall that once before, as I appeared before you all, I commented on the infiltration in May, generally speaking, it was around 30,000 North Vietnamese who came down.

"I was a little off about June because we know more about it. Those figures now, as best we can estimate, run about 30,000 in May, about 20,000 in June. Then it goes up again, 30,000 in July, and we estimate about 30,000 in August. So this is a very substantial level.

"We also estimate that in this year to date there have been in the neighborhood of 150,000 North Vietnamese come down into South Vietnam. So when you talk about the increased level, that is definitely so. There has been an increase."

Secretary Clifford pointed out that generally these figures represented replacements (as far as we can ascertain) because enemy losses have been high, not only from killed in action, but wounded, illness, desertion, and other causes.

Discussing U. S. bombing in the North, Secretary Clifford noted that President Johnson on March 31 cut the bombing back as a unilateral step of de-escalation. (The President said at that time that he would hope that the other side would take a similar kind of step.)

"I do not attach any real relationship between the restriction in the bombing and the increased number of infiltrees into South Vietnam," Secretary Clifford said, "because we have learned before in the course of the last three years that they will move the men and material that they choose to.

"If their losses go up in the process of moving, then apparently they just move more men and more supplies. So they have moved the men that they chose to move to get them into South Vietnam. As far as the restriction in the bombing and its effect, there have been approximately the same number of missions because our target is more concentrated down in the Panhandle. I think it has probably been more effective from an attrition standpoint.

"There were a number of reasons, I suppose, for the bombing before. But just attriting trucks and other forms of conveyances that come through, it has been quite effective.

"I do not believe that by cutting the bombing back to the 20th Parallel we have jeopardized the lives of our troops or allied troops in Vietnam."

He said he believed "that our present bombing policy is doing an effective job, about the best we can do, from the standpoint of attrition, as far as the movement of men and materiel into South Vietnam is concerned.

"I think it constitutes a protection for our men, and I think it is serving a very useful purpose. I believe the President feels strongly that it should be carried on until we get some kind of an arrangement from the North Vietnamese."

Asked what he would regard as a "clear signal" from the enemy that they were de-escalating, Secretary Clifford said:

"All they have to do is get word to us that they have reduced the level of combat and that they will continue to reduce the level of combat, and that that constitutes a de-escalatory step, and that we could then get on with substantive negotiations in Paris. This is obviously the simplest way."

OFFICIAL CALL—Adm. Waldemar F. A. Wendt (left), commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, is greeted by Air Force Gen. David A. Burchinal, deputy commander in chief, U.S. European Command, as the admiral arrives for his first official calls at EUCOM Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Adm. Wendt assumed command of Naval Forces in Europe July 12.

Reappraisal of Aid Policy

THE U.S., U.S.S.R. AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

Should the U.S. cut back foreign aid in favor of urgent domestic needs? In answering this question Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach recently assessed the scope and importance of U.S. involvement in the less-developed world. Below are excerpts from his address.

Ever since World War II, our policy toward the less-developed world has been based on the assumption that these countries are, on the whole, important to United States national security. Our goals have been peace, economic and social progress, and the encouragement of democratic institutions.

To preserve their independence, we have helped improve their defenses, worked for the peaceful settlement of disputes, played our part in deterring, and dealing with, external threats. To promote economic growth we have prodded their governments to speed up internal reform.

Our national security interest is involved in several ways.

To begin with, there are the countries like Turkey or Korea that are of strategic importance to the United States. We need to keep these countries out of hostile hands. Our aid, quite simply, is designed to make them economically and militarily self-reliant nations.

Another group—countries like India, Brazil, Indonesia or Pakistan—are weak economically and heavily dependent on international aid, but with the potential of becoming major powers.

The basic issue is whether these countries will become a friendly force in world affairs conducive to world peace. Outside assistance can ease their difficulties of transition and, at this stage of their development, while they still form their institutions, influence the way they will approach the world.

For years we have been urging other affluent countries to do more—only to find that these countries are now doing more than ourselves.

Political Payoff Limited

As both we and the Soviets have found, the political payoff afforded by aid is even now very limited. Developing nations are sensitive about their dependence on foreign aid. As a matter of domestic politics they have to be: for, being so heavily dependent, they must bend over backwards to avoid the impression, before their own citizens, that they have sacrificed the independence of their foreign policy.

Aid, for this reason, can be a liability as well as an asset to bilateral relations. These countries strongly resent the use of aid for purposes they consider extraneous to the aid relationship—namely as a lever to compel conformity to our—or any other donor's—foreign policy. The fact is that these countries will not sacrifice what they consider important national concerns—even at the cost of reduced aid.

So I believe it is important that we not be deflected from our central objective toward a view of aid as primarily a way of buying political influence. If we obtain from our aid a fallout in political influence and good will—well and good. But faithful conformity to our foreign policy views has not been, and should not be, the criterion for eligibility.

The Role of the U.S.S.R.

This issue of political influence in the less-developed world leads me to the consideration of the role of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, that of Communist China.

It is fair to say that at one time the rationale of our whole policy toward the less-developed world was put largely in terms of the threat of Communist influence and penetration. And, this remains an extremely important consideration in our policy. But it is also true that this issue of communism in the developing world, and particularly of Soviet motives and behavior, which once was—or seemed—so straightforward, is now far more complex.

The Change in World Communism

First, it is, of course, no longer correct to think of this problem in terms of a single unified movement of world communism. There is the Sino-Soviet split. In many countries—in Africa in particular—we find active competition between the Soviets and Communist China. In some countries we find Moscow-supported orthodox Communists, Trotskyists and Maoist-oriented groups.

And in Latin America, we find a split between Castroite-Marxist forces, with their emphasis on guerilla warfare and violent revolution, and the traditional Marxist parties which, while not ruling out violence at some future time,

would for the present try to gain power by nonviolent means.

Second, Soviet policy, as we now clearly see, has both an ideological and a national security component. At different times and places, one or the other component may be dominant. And the two are not always fully consonant.

In South Asia, the Soviet Union has generally worked for stability, economic development, and a relaxation of tensions between India and Pakistan. In West Asia, the Soviets have tried to improve relations with Turkey and Iran. And in Latin America, apparently unlike Castro's, Soviet policy, at least in the short term, has tended to emphasize correct state-to-state relations.

Our Relationship with Moscow

None of this is to say that the Soviet Union has now become a helpful influence in the developing world. Soviet intention toward the United States certainly remain antagonistic. But we should also recognize that the relationship between the Soviets and ourselves in the developing world is a complex one, that it contains elements not only of competition but also occasional strands of parallel action and interest.

Third, in judging the threat of communism, we should not forget the tremendous force of nationalism and the profound opposition in all these countries to external domination. Events in Eastern Europe have once again demonstrated the strength of these forces as has, in a different way, the history of Castro's relations with the Soviet Union or that of Sino-Soviet relations. In Africa—the area, in some respects, most vulnerable to Communist penetration—Soviet and Communist Chinese intrigues have been spectacularly unsuccessful.

The lesson we should draw is that the possibility of Communist takeover will be determined, except in special circumstances, by developments within these societies themselves rather than by external intrigue and manipulation—and that the prospects for totalitarian solutions will be diminished to the extent less-developed countries make reasonable progress in solving their problems.

The other lesson we should draw, I believe, is that—profound antagonisms notwithstanding—there is some common ground in this arena for occasional parallelism of Soviet and United States actions and interests. Over the long term, we should try to explore using this common ground to reduce conflict between the Soviets and ourselves in these areas of competition, as we are trying to do in others.

Can We Influence History?

Finally, let me consider the question of how much influence we ourselves, other Western countries, or the Soviets, for that matter, can hope to exercise on the direction and the final results of the development process itself.

On this point, all that can be said is that there are grounds for optimism and hope. We should acknowledge, with due humility, that we stand here before very large processes of history whose eventual shape and outcome we cannot, at this time, fully foresee. But this should not deter us from the attempt to influence history.

Taking first the economic aspects, all of us are familiar with the long list of problems and obstacles to rapid development: the sheer poverty—the painful choices between saving and consumption; the problem of exploding populations; the problem of how to increase export earnings.

But there have also been, to turn to the other side of the ledger, spectacular success stories. The list of countries graduating from the aid rolls is lengthening. And in much of the developing world, dramatic changes of economic structure are taking place, creating a solid base for further progress.

One example, in particular, is worth noting: the revolution in agricultural productivity now underway, associated with new high-yielding seed strains. Indian farmers of the Punjab are using new seeds which have increased wheat yields by up to 200-300 percent.

Already, trends in food supply are dramatically being reversed. Where only a few years ago the outlook in much of non-Communist Asia was one of growing food deficits, the prospects now are for self-sufficiency in grains some time in the 1970s.

Social and Political Aspects

Turning to the sociological and political aspects of the development process, I think we sometimes too readily assume that steady economic progress assures orderly social change.

This overlooks the many psychological and institutional and special interest barriers to development. In some cases, these barriers may be so strong that peaceful reform becomes impossible. In these cases, development may result in—even require—violence. We hope that such cases will be few. But we can expect such occurrences and should not be frightened by them.

Development is a profoundly unsettling experience. It involves the uprooting of ancient ways, the obliteration of traditional group and class distinctions, the willingness to opt for new ways of life. In a very real sense, it requires a new conception of self.

This, then, is the true scope of the task: Each of the developing countries must construct a new national identity fusing ancient ways with the new values required for the conduct of a modern economy. Our own role in these processes must be approached with great humility, with the recognition that our efforts must necessarily be limited, and that the results may not always be what we expect.

I think . . . that this is not the time to abandon our commitment to the cause of peaceful, nontotalitarian modernization. Our domestic needs are urgent and important to the health and well-being of our own society. Appraisal and reassessment of our involvements abroad are desirable. I think there will be—and should be—adjustments. But when all is said and done, this searching reexamination of our policies will confirm the soundness of our commitments.

Air Force Acts to Cut Active Officer Strength

The Air Force has taken action to reduce active duty officer strength to the end of fiscal year 1968 level. The move results from budgetary reductions called for in FY69.

The Air Force said the officer cut does not imply a lack of need for all officers currently on active duty, but rather a necessary response on the part of the Air Force to meet budgetary limitations.

Strength adjustments will be accomplished by speeding up release of active force officers who have previously indicated their desire to leave the service in the near future.

The following groups of officers will be included:

Regular Air Force officers who have their retirement or resignation date extended under the Selective Retention Officers Program will be given the opportunity to request release on a date earlier than now planned.

Active duty reserve officers with less than five years active duty as of June 30, 1969, who have established a date of separation (DOS) between July 1, 1969 and Dec. 31, 1969, will be released in increments through June 1969.

Active duty reserve officers with more than five years of active duty as of June 30, 1969, who have asked to be released between July 1, and Dec. 31, 1969, will be separated six months earlier if they so desire.

The Air Force said the reduction in force plan does not apply to officers in these fields:

Chaplains, JAGs, Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Nurses, Biomedical Sciences, Medical Services, or officers participating in student medical programs.

Separate instructions covering the early release of certain Air National Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized during January-May 1968 will be issued in the near future.

The Selective Retention of Regular Officers Program (Stop-Loss) will be held in abeyance until further notice, the Air Force said. All applications coming in, or now being processed, will be considered for approval on the desired effective date provided officers are otherwise eligible.

Officers who originally requested a separation date in FY68 and were selectively retained to a date in FY69 are not eligible for a DOS adjustment under the current Air Force action. But any officer in this category who has a hardship may submit a new resignation under the provisions of paragraph 16a, AFR 36-12, or request reconsideration for retirement under AFM 35-7.

Officers who originally requested a separation or retirement date in FY69 and were selectively retained to a date in FY70 may submit a letter or AF form 1161, as appropriate, requesting separation or retirement during FY69. In no instance will the desired effective date be earlier than 90 days from the date the Air Force announced the reduction program. (For clarification visit your local CBPO.)

Subject to special instructions are officers who are former career reserve officers now serving in noncareer status, or ROTC graduates (Reserve Officers) serving under specified tours. However, subject to the special instructions, the following applies to officers who have approved dates of separation between the period July 1, 1969 and Dec. 31, 1969, and to those officers who were eligible and had applied prior to the implementing action for a DOS during the same period, but actual approval had not been consummated.

Officers with less than five years total active military service as of June 30, 1969 will have their DOS rolled back six months (i.e., from Dec. 31, 1969 to June 30, 1969; Nov. 15, 1969 to May 15, 1969.)

Officers with five or more years total active military service as of June 30, 1969, will be handled in this manner: The provisions of paragraph 51a, AFR 36-12, are waived to permit these officers to immediately apply for separation under paragraph 62, AFR 36-12, if they so desire, to be effective during FY69 (not later than June 30, 1969) but no earlier than six months from current DOS.

DUGWAY TOUR.—Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development) Russell D. O'Neal (left) and Brig. Gen. John G. Appel (center), commanding general, Deseret Test Center, are given a tour and explanation of the operations of the data control center of the meteorology laboratory at DTC's Dugway, Utah, Proving Ground, by Paul Carlson, chief of DTC's instrumentation and operations branch.

Development of International Power

(Continued from Page 1)

greater willingness to face up to the problems of our own society. After years of neglect we are confronting head on the cruel problems of racial inequality . . .

"On the domestic side . . . we have unmatched abundance offset by inequalities and great needs, great wealth coupled with gnawing dissent and dissatisfaction. On the international side we face a parallel situation. Here, too, some of our problems are a direct outgrowth of our successes."

Tracing our course through the ominous atmosphere of the late 1940's, Mr. Katzenbach said "we responded with a world-wide system of defense alliances aiming to carry out a strategy of containment.

"The Marshall Plan and our aid to Japan and other friendly countries was designed to rebuild their economies and develop and maintain their strength. The success of this strategy is in large measure responsible for the new fusion of power.

"From a world dominated by two super powers, each surrounded by dependent and relatively disciplined allies, we have emerged into an era in which new centers of independent strength can freely operate."

He noted how until sometime ago it was still possible to talk meaningfully of "East" and "West" as somewhat coherent entities.

"Now, even conceptually," he said, "they are no longer really viable terms. China and the Soviet Union have pulled apart with seeming permanence. Yugoslavia, Roumania, and most recently Czechoslovakia, attracted by the economic advances in intellectual freedom of their neighbors are asserting their independence and moving slowly but perceptively toward shaping their own destinies.

"Though preserving their Communist identity, they are in varying degrees experimenting with a freer press, with incentives and freer markets. And, as the remarkable treatise by nuclear physicist Andrey Sakharov published last month in The New York Times gives evidence, ferment and pressures for liberalization are running strongly and just beneath the surface in the Soviet Union itself."

Our allies, too, have taken on independent positions, Mr. Katzenbach said. France has loosened its ties with NATO and has sought to carve out a distinct and separate role. Many of our allies differ with us on such important issues as recognition of Communist China. The European countries with our backing, have formed closer trading ties and may in the future agree on closer political ties as well.

"We look with favor on their assertion of greater independence. We are confident that a strong and unified Europe will cooperate with us in creating greater economic stability and well-being," he said.

Mr. Katzenbach noted how less-developed nations are also seeking to express their independent identities and are groping for new political forms. He reviewed how the newer countries, with relatively few exceptions, have also been remarkably successful in resisting the blandishments of the Communist powers and their efforts to impose their hegemony. Chinese attempts to make inroads in Africa, for instance, have met with no important successes.

"Most of the developing countries have been so successful in obtaining aid from more than one power," he said, "that the prospect of a Soviet-United States detente makes not a few of them quite visibly nervous. Their fear, of course, is that a relaxation of tension will decrease their leverage in obtaining assistance."

Mr. Katzenbach pointed out how, in this over-all situation, "the two major powers, despite their size and strength, are far less able to use their power to gain specific objectives. Their military power is receding in relative importance and their need to vie in the area of moral and political influence is correspondingly greater."

He said the deep psychological need for people to identify with a national grouping is continuing to assert itself. The tendency almost everywhere seems to be in the direction of greater independence, greater pragmatism, and less reliance on rigid ideological precepts.

NEW OBSERVER—Marines of Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 inspect the Corps' newest visual observation and reconnaissance plane, the OV-10A Bronco, during the aircraft's first stop at Quang Tri, Vietnam, Air Base. The Bronco, assigned to MAG-16 at Da Nang, landed at Quang Tri to rearm with 2.75-inch target marking rockets.

Defense Studying Electric Drive Underwater Boat

The Defense Department is continuing its study of a new type of electric-drive, underwater boat that would be quieter than other submarines.

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, at his Aug. 15 news conference, said "It would mean a very substantial difference in the conformation, the length and weight of the submarine.

"But the idea is that this new type, called the electric-drive submarine, would be quieter than others. It has been recommended that it would be valuable to build this kind of submarine."

Secretary Clifford said the new submarine would be "exceedingly expensive" and that new theories would be used. "As you would know," he said, "it would constitute a different kind of power plant within a submarine."

He said only one would be built so that "in the process we would learn a lot about the question of silence in submarines that would be helpful to us as we build others."

Secretary Clifford said the study was continuing and that "a number of individuals in both the Senate and House have evidenced an interest in it. We will want the benefit of any opinion they have," he said.

Indicating there would not be a final decision for several weeks, Mr. Clifford said the decision would be reached on the basis of whether we should put this amount of money in this electric-drive submarine or go on with another type of submarine.

He said "It is not just building this or not building another submarine, but the question is whether to build this electric-drive one or another type. It is going to be a close question."

Army Takes Further Action To Cut FY69 Expenditures

The Army took further action Aug. 16 to reduce FY69 expenditures as required by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. (Over-all Defense Department planning calls for a reduction of expenditures in FY69 by up to $3 billion and "new obligational authority" by $5 billion.)

The Army said 23 Nike Hercules firing sites and seven headquarters installations will be closed. In addition, two double battery sites will be reduced to a single battery each.

It is expected that $18.8 million will be saved by these closings in FY 69, and $54 million in each succeeding year. The active military personnel strength of the Army will be reduced by 4,200 spaces.

The firing sites to be closed out are located at: Van Nuys, Calif.; Newhall, Calif.; Lemont, Ill.; Munster, Ind.; Selfridge AFB, Mich.; Irwin, Pa.; Edgemont, Pa.; Annapolis, Md.; Old Bridge, N. J.; Hazlet, N. J.; Cromwell, Conn.; Marine, Ill.; Hecker, Ill.; Grafton, Ill.; Pacific, Mo.; Lawson, Mo.; Pleasant Hill, Mo.; Gardner, Kans.; Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Denton, Tex.; Terrell, Tex.; Alvarado, Tex., and Camp Wolters, Tex.

WELL DONE—Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, deputy commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, offers personal congratulations to Cpl. Bernard Chittum, 1st Bn., Seventh Marine Regiment. Cpl. Chittum explained how his squad accounted for four confirmed kills on a recent combat patrol.

The firing sites to be reduced to single batteries are located at Warrington, Pa., and Fort Tilden, N. Y.

The seven headquarters installations to be closed are located at Saugus, Calif.; Tappan, N. Y.; Scott AFB, Ill.; Pleasant Hill, Mo.; Olathe NAS, Kans., and Duncanville, Tex. (There are two headquarters installations at Duncanville.)

National Guard units currently man eight of the sites to be inactivated (Annapolis, Md.; Cromwell, Conn.; Lemont, Ill.; Lawson, Mo.; Pleasant Hill, Mo.; Denton, Tex.; Terrell, Tex., and a portion at Duncanville, Tex., plus the site at Warrington, Pa., which will be reduced to a single battery.) The ARNG units at Annapolis, Cromwell and Lemont will move to other Nike Hercules sites at Davidsonville, Md., East Windsor, Conn., and Montrose Beach Park, Chicago, Ill., and relieve the active Army units manning those sites.

The Army said the site at Warrington, Pa., is a double firing battery having Battery A and Battery B, 2d Missile Bn., 166th Artillery co-located. Members of the Pennsylvania ARNG man these units.

Battery B will be inactivated, thus leaving a single firing battery. Personnel from the inactivated battery may move to and work with the New Jersey ARNG unit which will be activated to relieve the active Army unit at Franklin Lakes, N. J. The Active Army personnel at this and other active Army sites involved will be transferred and used elsewhere within the Army.

The ARNG units at the air defense sites in Missouri and Texas will be inactivated. Since there will be no active Army air defense sites operating in the vicinity of these ARNG units, the personnel cannot be transferred as in Maryland, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and Illinois. The technicians at these sites will be released while the military personnel will be transferred to other ARNG units.

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